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[Abstract] This paper argues that unconventional methods and special operations 
should not be limited to military Special Operations Forces (SOF). It examines a 
potential role for SOF in a Counter Insurgency (COIN), with speciﬁc reference to 
Unity of Effort. It postulates that Special Forces are the sharpest instruments in the 
military toolbox available to policymakers, yet the great tactical success of these 
forces has not necessarily been translated into strategic success.
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Introduction1 
 
This paper argues that unconventional methods and special operations 
should not be limited to military Special Operations Forces. It examines a 
potential role for Special Operations Forces (SOF) in a Counter Insurgency 
(COIN), with specific reference to Unity of Effort. Special Forces are the 
sharpest instruments in the military toolbox available to policymakers, yet 
the great tactical success of these forces has not necessarily been translated 
into strategic success. The underlying argument is that the successes of 
unorthodox means for political ends learnt from Special Operations 
Executive (SOE) during the Second World War paved the way for today’s 
SOF. The lesson learnt, however, was the wrong one. Rather, the principal 
lesson to be learnt from SOE activities during the Second World War is not 
one of employing unorthodox means for political ends, but of the need for a 
Unity of Effort towards international crises/conflicts/insurgencies that 
includes Unconventional Methods. In the present working paper, this will be 
done by: 
 
1) contextualizing Unity of Effort 
2) contextualizing COIN 
2) contrasting COIN with SOF, as seen through SOF doctrine and practice 
3) comparing SOF and SOE 
4) exploring Unconventional Methods and Unity of Effort 
 
 
Unity of Effort 
 
Drawing on experiences from Somalia, the Balkans, Kosovo, and especially 
Afghanistan and Iraq, several states have sought to develop their own 
comprehensive approaches as a strategy for managing international crises 
involving stabilization and reconstruction efforts. Canada has its 3D 
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approach – Diplomacy, Development and Defence. The UK has the PCRU – 
Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit. The USA has S/CRS – Office of the 
Coordination for Reconstruction and Stabilization. All these are examples of 
national, whole-of-government approaches. Also international organizations 
are working to forge comprehensive approach strategies. The UN has its 
System-Wide Coherence in a development context and Integrated Missions 
for a peace-keeping and peace-building context. NATO has laboured on its 
EBAO – Effects-Based Approach to Operations – for years. All these efforts 
are based, in way or another, on achieving a unity of effort between the 
various actors, agencies, and organizations. 
 
There is, however, a gap between policy intent and field reality in all these 
comprehensive proposals and holistic endeavours. Ideally, the various actors 
involved in, for example, Afghanistan should share the same objectives: to 
stabilize the country, build central institutions, establish the rule of law, 
promote economic growth, and spread democratic ideals. Due to the 
complex arrangement of actors and the complex scope of activities, in 
managing international crisis there seem to be barriers between nations, 
agencies, departments, and organizations on how to engage each other 
effectively. The slow progress in conflicts such as Afghanistan is marked by 
a lack of cooperation, coherence and coordination between actors and 
agencies. In addition, there is a ‘policy–policy’ gap between different 
nations and organizations. In particular, there is no commonly agreed 
definition on what a, or the, ‘comprehensive approach’ is. 
 
The cases of Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated how military means 
alone cannot quell an insurgency. The military response, which will be 
discussed later, has been to develop a counterinsurgency doctrine that 
embodies a more holistic approach. There is a realization in military circles 
that ‘in a counterinsurgency, all efforts should be focused on supporting the 
local populace and host-nation government’ because ‘political, social, and 
economic programs are usually far more valuable than conventional military 
operations in resolving the root causes of conflict and undermining an 
insurgency.’ (Vego, 2007: 5; see also Gompert & Gordon 2008) However, 
 6
one might well ask why the military should be responsible for developing a 
COIN doctrine with a comprehensive approach. 
 
An interesting historic parallel, and explanation, can be found in the 
Vietnam War. Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support 
(CORDS) was an operating agency set up and tasked to support pacification 
efforts in Vietnam. It was organized so that it would have a single manager 
at each level, representing a single official voice, and that each level would 
be responsible for integrated military/civilian planning, programming, and 
operations (see Wells, 1991). In other words, CORDS sought to integrate 
horizontally a series of political, military, economic, and informational 
programmes to maximize the pacification effort in Vietnam. It did this in 
much the same way as a military commander would organize his efforts, 
rather than a coordinator or advisor, and it was led by a civilian. The breadth 
of CORDS was all-encompassing: ‘With few exceptions, all American 
programs outside of Saigon, excluding American and South Vietnamese 
regular military forces and clandestine CIA operations, came under the 
operational control of CORDS’ (Scoville, 1982, cited in Wells, 1991). This 
example of unity of effort represents a national attempt at a comprehensive 
approach which, although it enjoyed considerable success, was criticized for 
coming too late in the US war effort in Vietnam. 
 
The main challenge to unity of effort and a comprehensive approach in 
today’s context involves leadership. Military leaders are not granted control 
of all the organizations in the theatre of operations. The complex diplomatic, 
information, military, and economic context naturally precludes that (Vego: 
2007: 17), as does the multi-national aspect. Conversely, a comprehensive 
approach to the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan is as much a military as 
a civilian process, because there can be no civil progress without constant 
real security. There seems to be a schism here: between those who see 
economic, social, and political development as a precursor to political 
stability, which would then naturally foster security; and those who see 
military security as the first requirement to establishing effective economic, 
social and political conditions. In the case of Afghanistan, the dire security 
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situation which restricts civilian aid efforts, the complex multi-national 
military effort (divided between ISAF and OEF), the limited role of the UN, 
and the lack of Afghan central power all add up to a situation where no 
single agency or force can solve the problems on its own. 
 
Finally, the ‘post-conflict’ phase of operations in Afghanistan is nothing of 
the sort. A renascent Taliban is leading an insurgency, made all the more 
complicated by the influx of cross-border fighters from Pakistan and foreign 
jihadists from elsewhere. The central government of Hamid Karzai is 
struggling to provide basic amenities and security to the Afghan population, 
and the NATO-led coalition ISAF is present with an ever-larger 
conventional force, alongside SOF contingents, to aid the Afghan 
government. The need for stabilization is apparent, yet the continued 
belligerence of the Taliban necessitates a firmer response: 
counterinsurgency, or ‘COIN’. 
 
 
COIN 
 
Insurgencies and counterinsurgencies are nothing new. Subduing insurgent 
populations has been a form of warfare since ancient times, from the 
Romans quelling Britannic and Gaul resistance to Pax Romana, through the 
French in Algeria, to the British in Malaya, and the USA in Vietnam. The 
definition of an insurgency varies as the phenomenon has continued to 
evolve, ranging from revolutionary war, guerrilla war, people’s war, and so 
on. The US Joint Doctrine defines an insurgency as an organized movement 
aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of 
subversion and armed conflict (JP 1-02). According to the new US FM 3-24 
Counterinsurgency: ‘an insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-
military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an 
established government, occupying power, or other political authority while 
increasing insurgent control’ (US Army, 2006: 1–2).  
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Counterinsurgency, by contrast, is understood as those military, 
paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a 
government to defeat an insurgency 
(Miller, 2003: 9). It is a highly complex, resource-intensive and protracted 
effort, and its ultimate objective is mostly non-military (Vego, 2007: 5). In 
the case of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai’s government should be the 
instigator of the COIN campaign and use the full range of policy options 
available to combat the insurgency. This includes military operations by the 
ANA (Afghan National Army), upholding law and order by policing with 
the ANP (Afghan National Police), development projects to improve 
infrastructure and provide education to children, and a host of other 
government actions with one overarching aim: to prove its legitimacy to 
govern by creating and sustaining security and managing political, 
economic, and social developments (US Marine Corps, 2006: 14).  
 
On a similar note, the government of Hamid Karzai is supported by 
international organizations (UNAMA), multinational military forces (ISAF), 
international government agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGO), 
and private volunteer organizations (PVO). The importance of non-military 
means in conjunction with military means cannot be overstated. As General 
Sir Frank Kitson (1997: 283) made clear, there ‘is no such thing as a purely 
military solution because insurgency is not primary a military activity’. In 
this he is seconded by Dr Milan Vego (2007: 5), who says that ‘a 
counterinsurgency is essentially a political problem’. In sum, to succeed in a 
counterinsurgency one needs to have unity of effort and a comprehensive 
approach to the problem. 
 
A recent RAND report identifies three main factors which influence the 
outcome of an insurgency: governance, external support, and the quality of 
security forces (Jones, 2008).  Essentially, the less governance a state has, 
the more external support the insurgents have, and the lower the quality of 
the state’s security forces are, the more likely an insurgency is to succeed. 
One could therefore assume that a COIN strategy would be the converse: to 
strengthen governance, mitigate external support and upgrade the quality of 
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the security forces. In Afghanistan this is operationalized by supporting 
Hamid Karzai’s central government through the ‘five pillars’ of the 2001 
Bonn Agreement. The same report also suggests that there are other factors 
involved, such as the terrain, population size, and GDP, but these factors are 
outside the control of the counter-insurgent.  
 
Military COIN strategy, if there is such a thing, traditionally places a 
premium on 1) learning and adapting; 2) minimal use of force; 3) a focus on 
static forces; and 4) empowering the affected nation, its forces and 
institutions (Håvoll, 2008). In other words, military forces used in COIN 
operations must be able to learn quickly learn about the adversary’s ever-
changing tactics and adapt their own tactics accordingly. The military forces 
must also show restraint in the use of military power. Excessive use of force 
and the resultant collateral damage – a trend on the rise in Afghanistan – is 
strikingly counter-productive for a counter-insurgent. Military forces should 
also leave a light ‘footprint’, yet be able to hold and protect areas from 
insurgent infiltration. Finally military forces can be used to train, support, 
educate and develop the host-nation’s own security forces.  
 
The importance and relevance of these four military COIN strategies will be 
discussed below, with specific reference to SOF. The next section will deal 
with whether ‘SOF are tailormade for COIN’, as some military commanders 
have claimed. 
 
 
SOF 
 
A leading role in the ‘War on Terrorism’ has fallen to Special Operations 
Forces (SOF) because of their direct-action capabilities against targets in 
remote or denied areas. This development was spurred by the idea that there 
existed a cost-effective ‘SOF solution’ after the successful (and spectacular) 
employment of a limited number of SOF personnel, in combination with 
overwhelming airpower and local war-fighters, to bring about the downfall 
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of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001/022. One could argue that the early 
successes of SOF in Afghanistan came as a result of the correct employment 
of these forces. SOF should be used for strategic effects: effects that have a 
direct bearing on the outcome of the conflict. In that sense, the initial 
strategic effect in Afghanistan was achieved: the Taliban were swept from 
power, and Al Qaida no longer had its safe haven. 
 
SOF is surrounded by myths, and normally keeps a low public profile. 
Specifics with regards to numbers, capabilities, equipment and missions are 
always classified. This paper will not delve into the secrecy that surrounds 
these forces, nor will it discuss the reasons behind this covert stature. 
Instead, it will use doctrine as a basis for understanding SOF. In many ways, 
doctrine offers the only official and genuine glimpse into SOF. While 
doctrines are generalist in their descriptions, they do define the capabilities 
to be fielded by SOF with regard to organization, training, materiel, 
leadership and education, personnel and facilities. Most of all, they provide 
guidance, for SOF and policymakers alike, on the application of SOF.  
Alexander Alderson, head of the panel which is currently updating the 
British Army’s COIN doctrine, comments: ‘doctrine provides the bridge 
from theory to practice based on an understanding of experience’ (Alderson, 
2007/08: 4). Reality/ground truth may not necessarily reflect doctrine, but 
the emphasis placed on different core characteristics and missions of SOF 
should indicate how these are being used in COIN operations today. 
 
In military circles, SOF is unorthodox and strikingly different from 
conventional military forces. As Kilcullen (2007) notes: ‘They are defined 
by internal comparison to the rest of the military – SOF undertake tasks 
"beyond the capabilities" of general-purpose forces’. As described in the US 
doctrine for SOF Task Force Operations (JP 3-05.1), ‘Special operations 
forces (SOF) are small, specially organized units manned by people 
carefully selected and trained to operate under physically demanding and 
psychologically stressful conditions to accomplish missions using modified 
                                                 
2  On the overthrow of the Taliban regime, see Schroen, 2005; Biddle, 2002; Berntsen & 
Pezzullo, 2005; Woodward, 2002. 
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equipment and unconventional applications of tactics against strategic and 
operational objectives’ (US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007). On a similar note, 
Special Operations Commander Europe (SOCEUR) notes: ‘Core 
characteristics of SOF include specialized skills, equipment and tactics, 
techniques, and procedures, including area expertise, language skills and 
cultural awareness’ (SOCEUR, SOF Truths). 
 
These broad definitions of SOF are then invariably narrowed down to core 
tasks or missions. The USA now has nine standard SOF missions: Direct 
Action (DA), Special Reconnaissance (SR), Unconventional Warfare (UW), 
Foreign Internal Defence (FID), Counter-Terrorism (CT), Psychological 
Operations (PSYOP), Counter-proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD), Information Operations (IO), and Civil Affairs (CA) 
(US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007, ch. 2). Thus, SOF are organized, trained, 
and continuously enhance their capabilities to be able to conduct these 
generic missions.  
 
Grouping these generic missions into recognizable roles might further 
clarify what SOF actually does. The UK has a slightly different approach, 
narrowing their core tasks into three distinct roles: Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance, Offensive Actionand Support and Influence. These roles 
can be used in all phases (pre-, post- and during conflict), in isolation or to 
complement each other.3 The point to note regardless of these SOF missions 
or roles, is that they should be employed for strategic effect. That is, 
identifying and attacking the enemy’s Clausewitzian Centre of Gravity, 
commonly believed to be the enemy’s long-term capacity and will to fight.4 
The main problem, however, is that it is not the enemy that is the Centre of 
Gravity in COIN: it is the people (Mattis, 2006: 7). 
 
This represents the main problem with the employment of SOF in today’s 
COIN campaigns. The perception that there exists a singular ‘SOF solution’, 
or that SOF are ‘tailormade for COIN’, is misguided. How can an elite 
                                                 
3  Private discussion with UK SOF officer in Afghanistan, June 2005  
4  Ibid. 
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military force like SOF win ‘the people’? While SOF certainly represent a 
formidable military asset, composed as they are of extremely well-trained, 
selected individuals with impressive individual skills, they have in essence 
become more of a military SWAT team and less of an innovative, 
unconventional strategic asset. Today’s SOF are trained and geared for 
achieving direct military effects, rather than civilian effects. This is seen 
through the heavy emphasis on typical ‘hard-core military’ operations, such 
as SR and DA, over more ‘soft power’ operations, such as IO, CA and 
PSYOPS. Another mental hurdle for all military forces in COIN, including 
SOF, is that military effects do not automatically translate into civilian 
effects: you may win all the battles, but still lose the war. 
 
What we see in Afghanistan today is that SOF are used in their generic roles 
in support of the conventional military forces, with an emphasis on SR, DA 
and, to a certain extent, FID. As Rothstein remarks: ‘SOF have become 
hyper-conventional, not unconventional.’ (2006: 122) The tipping point of 
this development came with operation ‘Anaconda’ in March 2002. The 
graph below5 is a visualization of how the Taliban went from being a more 
or less conventional force (in Afghan terms) at the onset of hostilities in 
November 2001 to today’s more unconventional guerrilla force. At the same 
time, the deployment of, and operations by, US and coalition forces shifted 
from highly unconventional to conventional.  
 
 
 
                                                 
5  I am most grateful to LtC Halvor Johansen, Norwegian Defence Command and Staff 
College, for this graph. It is inspired by Rothstein, Afghanistan and the troubled future of 
unconventional warfare 
time 
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The fall of Kabul on 12 November, only five days after the start of the 
campaign, came as the result of a relatively small SOF (and CIA) 
contribution, operating in conjunction with the Northern Alliance and 
overwhelming US airpower. The ground forces were almost entirely local 
nationals, advised by US SOF and supported by US airpower. Other Taliban 
strongholds, such as Kunduz and Kandahar, fell in rapid succession. The fall 
of Kandahar was also marked by the first deployment of regular combat 
troops to Afghanistan. One thousand US marines were deployed in the 
desert south of Kandahar to set up a forward operating base. A surge of 
conventional units to consolidate the gains in Afghanistan would soon 
follow, and that marked the start of ‘conventionalizing SOF’ in Afghanistan. 
By December, sizeable Al Qaida and Taliban forces had retreated to the 
Tora Bora mountains, where they were protected in underground caverns. 
Once again, SOF in conjunction with local militia and US airpower proved a 
formidable combination, and the enemy were either killed or managed to 
flee to neighbouring Pakistan. It was not until March 2002, when a large 
concentration of Taliban fighters were discovered hiding in the Shahi-Kot 
mountains in Paktia province, that SOF lost its strategic unconventional 
‘edge’. 
 
It was believed that the Taliban forces were planning to use their sanctuary 
in Shahi-Kot as a base for large-scale mujahedeen guerrilla attacks, much 
the same way the Afghans battled the Red Army in the 1980s. Operation 
‘Anaconda’ was devised to route the Taliban from this sanctuary, and it was 
designed as an (overly complicated) conventional military operation, with 
conventional units such as the 10th Mountain Division and 101st Airborne 
Division in the lead. A sizeable contingent of SOF participated, but their role 
was no longer unconventional. They provided intelligence through SR and 
directed fire support, all in support of the conventional units fighting the 
Taliban in the mountains. The only unconventional aspect in ‘Anaconda’ 
was TF Hammer, a large force Afghan militia and a SOF advisory team. 
This force, originally intended for an assault from the west towards Shahi-
Kot, was decimated by friendly fire, became demoralized from lack of 
promised air support, and took heavy casualties from Taliban forces before 
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even reaching its objective.6 Priorities had, quite simply, shifted away from 
the unconventional to the conventional military forces – and yet the legacy 
of the early successes of SOF in Afghanistan has persisted. This is why 
many believe there is a ‘SOF solution’ and that ‘SOF is tailormade for 
COIN’. If there is a ‘SOF solution’, then its success hinges on correct 
strategic employment, unconventionality, and local nationals. 
 
One of the reasons for this belief is how Special Operations Forces seem to 
suit the four principles of military COIN mentioned above. SOF have the 
ability to use precise firepower, thus minimizing collateral. They are small 
and highly mobile, thus leaving a light footprint. They are much faster in 
implementing new tactics and techniques than their conventional 
counterparts, much thanks to their organizational mindset and small size. 
And finally, SOF are competent to train host-nation security forces through 
the FID portion of their doctrinal missions. To quote the new FM 3-24 
COIN doctrine: ‘For small-scale COIN efforts, SOF may be the only forces 
used. SOF organizations may be ideally suited for developing security forces 
through the FID (Foreign Internal Defence) portion of their doctrinal 
mission’ (US Army, 2006: point 6-22). 
 
The use of SOF for FID in Afghanistan is a strategically correct use of these 
forces under current circumstances. Capitalizing on their ‘light, agile, high-
capability teams, able to operate discreetly in local communities’ (US Army, 
2006: point 2-18) SOF ‘emphasize training HN forces to perform essential 
defence functions’ (ibid: point 2-20). This is a core SOF task and Special 
Operations Forces have long been the lead organization in training and 
advising foreign armed forces.7 The main problem in Afghanistan is one of 
scale. As stated in FM 3-24 (point 6-13): ‘While SOF personnel may be 
ideal for some training and advisory roles, their limited numbers restrict 
their ability to carry out large-scale missions to develop HN security forces.’ 
This has spurred the development of various ad hoc training regimes for 
                                                 
6  For an excellent description and analysis of Operation ‘Anaconda’, see Naylor, 2005. 
7  FM 31-20-3 outlines Army Special Forces training programmes and tactics, techniques, and 
procedures. (US Army, 1994) 
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Afghanistan’s security forces, ranging from OMLT (Operational Mentoring 
and Liaison Teams) to ETT (Embedded Training Teams) to outright basic 
military schools, where large Afghan National Army units rotate through. 
Most of these training arrangements are led by conventional units and do not 
function optimally due to complicated command relationships, national 
caveats, and lack of resources.  
 
To sum up, in counterinsurgency efforts against an irregular adversary, the 
strategically correct and offensive use of SOF should focus on training the 
host nation’s security forces. SOF excellence in special reconnaissance and 
direct action, which may provide extremely valuable intelligence or the 
capture of high-value targets, should by no means be dismissed. Although 
they are complementary activities, these endeavours remain more of a 
supportive, tactical nature in COIN operations, and are, in fact, defensive in 
an overall COIN strategy. At the latest NATO SOF symposium in 2008, 
Kilcullen offered some insights on this argument. He argued that keeping the 
insurgents unbalanced and on the run through SR and DA is essentially 
strategic disruption, a defensive strategy. The main purpose is to buy time 
for the strategic offensive, where military assistance through FID will be the 
most important SOF contribution. In Afghanistan today, SOF are extremely 
well adapted for SR and DA, with an impressive track record and a high 
success rate. Yet the lack of capitalization on FID means that the situation 
remains stagnant.  
 
 
SOE 
 
The Second World War may be a limited analogy, but some of the lessons 
identified have not become outdated. Despite the obvious and numerous 
differences compared to the current situation in Afghanistan, parallels can be 
drawn, and some aspects are more or less a direct consequence of the 
Second World War. Indeed, one of these consequences is the development 
of SOF itself. 
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SOF can trace their origin to SOE (and the OSS in the USA). Today's SOF 
are, as discussed above, elite military forces with highly specialized 
capabilities optimized for nine standard missions, whilst SOE was a mixed 
civilian–military organization that took on whatever missions were 
demanded, building capabilities as needed.8 During the Second World War 
the British SOE (Special Operations Executive) carried out a broad range of 
operations against the Axis powers, on enemy soil. The SOE was, in this 
author’s opinion, the true special force of the Second World War, and it 
should be recognized as an important aspect of the British war effort.  
 
In the same way as SOF represent only one aspect of operations in 
Afghanistan, so does SOE represent only one aspect of the broader British 
war effort. The most substantial difference between the two lies in the 
comprehensiveness of the war effort. The British were forced to adopt a 
whole-of-government approach, by unifying their political, military, and 
civilian efforts in order to defeat Nazi Germany. It was a matter of national 
survival – but the same cannot be said of Western involvement in 
Afghanistan today. My point is that the British war effort was made all the 
more comprehensive by establishing an unorthodox organization tasked to 
undertake unconventional warfare against the Axis powers in conjunction 
with other government agencies, own and foreign military, own and foreign 
ministries, foreign governments, and local collaborators.  
 
A broad description and discussion of SOE activities is beyond the scope of 
this paper.9 Instead, I will focus on some of its roles, traits, and successes, 
contrasting it with modern-day SOF. The underlying premise is that 
objectives and techniques are not so different now from then. There has been 
a renaissance in the use of covert operations in international politics, not 
least those undertaken in the ‘War on Terror’.  
 
Often referred to as ‘the Ministry for Ungentlemanly warfare’, SOE was 
responsible to the Minister of Economic Warfare. It was also, initially, led 
                                                 
8  Inspired by Kilcullen, 2007.  
9  For more on SOE see Foot, 1999; and MacKenzie, 2002. 
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by Hugh Dalton, then minister of Economic Warfare, who acquired the 
additional title of Minister of Special Operations. It was formed from three 
different existing departments: Section D of MI6, Military Intelligence 
Research from the War Office, and the propaganda organization called 
Department EH (‘Electra House’). It included a substantial number of 
civilians as well as military personnel; experts in a wide range of fields – 
linguistics, anthropology, physics, and so on. Finally, SOE was organized in 
two distinct sections: SO1 and SO2.10 SO1 was tasked with ‘black 
propaganda’11 (information) and SO2 carried out ‘special operations’ 
(operations). The connection between ‘special operations’ and ‘black 
propaganda’ lay at the heart of SOE. 
 
Three things stand out here: the connection between information operations 
(propaganda) and special operations; the role of local nationals; and the 
innovative strategic-effects thinking. 
 
Firstly, SO1 operated numerous radio stations, broadcasting from mainland 
UK and occupied territories. F4 Radio Gaulle12 is an example of the 
innovative information operations conducted by SO1. The speakers were 
members of the Free French, broadcasting a content intended to train the 
resistance groups. True innovation appears when one contrasts it with F1 
Radio Inconnue,13 another SO1 operation. Supposedly broadcasting from 
Paris, its subversive content was meant to promote passive resistance to the 
Nazi occupation of France. It was ‘attached’ to Pétain and the Vichy regime, 
and was kept secret from the Free French and de Gaulle. It was recognized 
that ‘who’ that was sending the message was more important than ‘what’ the 
                                                 
10  A third section, SO3, was an administrative unit. 
11  As to the difference between White, Grey and Black propaganda: Black propaganda is false 
material where the source is disguised. It is propaganda that purports to be from a source on 
one side of a conflict, but is actually from the opposing side. It contrasts with grey 
propaganda, the source of which is not identified, and white propaganda, in which the real 
source is declared. Source: www.wikipedia.org (accessed 23 September 2008) 
12  426 programmes, 25.8.41 – 15.11.42. from 
http://clutch.open.ac.uk/schools/emerson00/s_o_epage%203.html (accessed 28 August 
2008) 
13  1145 programmes, 15.11.40 – 10.1.44. from 
http://clutch.open.ac.uk/schools/emerson00/s_o_epage%203.html (accessed 28 August 
2008) 
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message was. SO2, on the other hand, supported the various national 
resistance movements more directly. SOE agents would train in Britain and 
be transported into occupied territories to organize, support, provide 
intelligence, and train local resistance groups. The combined effects of 
operations and information meant that SOE achieved a value-added effect. 
Radio broadcasts would encourage people to resist German occupation, 
support the Allied war effort, promote recruitment to resistance movements, 
and so on. They would also be used to send encrypted messages to 
operatives in occupied territories. 
 
This is strikingly similar to how Al Qaida and other Islamic Jihadist groups 
operate in today’s information world. They combine operations with 
information when they publish video clips of successful ambushes against 
Western military on the internet or against Danish caricatures. These clips 
serve the same objectives as SO1 radio broadcasts: they subvert the audience 
to their cause, they encourage recruitment to their cause, they boost morale 
for their cause, and so on. In addition, they have an added impact by the very 
nature of ‘who’ is sending the message. They rally/mobilize the Centre of 
Gravity, the people, to their cause by ‘propaganda of the deed’, whereby the 
‘political and emotional impact of the event is…achieved by the instruments 
of the virtual dimension, not by the physical circumstances of the attack 
itself’ (Mackinlay, 2008: 37). Al Qaida also use the internet for 
communication, either to send encrypted messages to other cells or to 
communicate with operatives (Vego, 2007: 4), much as SOE used radio 
broadcasts and wireless operators in the occupied territories of Europe 
during the Second World War. 
 
Secondly, SOE recognized, and used, the importance of local nationals in 
the same way that it was recognized and used by US strategic planners for 
the initial campaign in Afghanistan. To be able to operate discreetly and 
successfully in occupied territories or foreign states, SOE agents relied on 
local nationals for local and cultural knowledge. Such in-depth knowledge 
was crucial for collaboration with foreign resistance movements, gaining 
influence in the society, and remaining undetected by the enemy.  
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 The principal challenge was how to gain access to such knowledge, because 
it can normally be acquired in only two ways: either by long-term immersion 
in foreign societies or by recruiting from those societies. Britain, as an 
imperial power with many colonies at that time, had a distinct advantage, 
with many expats and colonial officers living in foreign countries. These 
people not only had intimate knowledge of their ‘turf’, in many cases they 
were also empowered through their positions in local, colonial 
administration. In occupied Europe the situation was different, and SOE 
recruited its agents directly from those countries. These agents would be 
trained by SOE in a range of skills, from commando training to parachute 
training, demolition training, and so on. These skills would then be used in 
clandestine operations or transferred to local resistance groups. This bears 
more than a passing resemblance to how SOF is conducting FID in 
Afghanistan today. 
 
Thirdly, the innovative strategic-effects thinking behind many SOE 
operations can provide excellent examples of how to think unconventionally 
and asymmetrically. As pointed out, special operations should have strategic 
effects, i.e. a direct impact on the outcome of the conflict, as opposed to a 
supporting impact. The Allied bombing of Germany was undertaken for the 
strategic effect of ‘bombing the Nazis to surrender’ – a concept that later 
research has shown had a marginal effect on the German will to fight. 
Interestingly enough, Bomber Command was not very fond of SOE and 
resented having to lend aircraft for ‘unethical’ clandestine missions. They 
wanted to win the war by bombing Germany to its knees (Morris, 2001) – an 
effort that would require thousands of aircraft, crew members, and 
explosives. By contrast, SOE operation ‘Gunnerside’, involving only six or 
seven SOE agents, effectively halted the Nazi nuclear-weapons programme 
to such an extent that Germany was never able to develop its own nuclear 
weapons, a prospect that definitely would have altered the outcome of the 
war.  
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One might object to the comparison between SOE and SOF. True, SOE was 
an insurgent force rather than a counter-insurgent force. It was, after all, 
tasked by Churchill himself to ‘set Europe ablaze’ by means of sabotage and 
subversion. Perhaps SOE became so innovative because it was an insurgent 
force, as opposed to a counter-insurgent force? Might SOE bear more 
resemblance to Al Qaida than SOF? SOE was an agency whose actions, not 
unlike today’s operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, took place in public view. 
Its role was essentially that of a facilitator. Its success hinged on its ability to 
collaborate with foreign resistance movements or allied services, which 
pursued their own national, political or sectional interest with scant regard 
for the wishes of the British government (Wylie, 2005: 3).  
 
To sum up, SOE was an organisation capable of operating in a wide variety 
of different contexts. According to Wylie, 
  
[i]ts methods went beyond the traditional realms of irregular warfare and 
embraced a raft of operations whose principal focus was political, economic, 
financial or even psychological. While clearly SOE was unable to 
demonstrate a proficiency in all those areas, all of the time, in mastering 
these arts, it showed itself very much in tune with the context of ‘total war’ 
into which it was born. In SOE ‘special operations’ became more than 
simply an adjunct to Britain’s military operations, but instead came to 
embody a distinctly ‘modern’ approach to secret service activity, an activity 
which remains as central to a state’s politico-military armoury today as it did 
60 years ago. (Wylie, 2005: 11)  
 
 
Unity of Effort and Unconventional Methods 
 
Perhaps the chief lesson that should be learned from Afghanistan and Iraq is 
the limited capacity of conventional government machinery to cope flexibly 
with unconventional insurgency problems. Unified management of political, 
military, and economic conflict will produce the best results, both where 
policy is made and in the field (Wells, 1991). Thus, combining a unity of 
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effort between the actors with unconventional methods will enhance 
counterinsurgency efforts. This was tried with CORDS in Vietnam, but it 
represented a national effort, involving primarily US government agencies 
and US organizations.  
 
The concept of multi-national, allied inter-agency cooperation, multi-agency 
coordination and whole-of-government approach emerged during the 
Second World War. As with all other conflicts, the conditions were unique, 
in that it was a fight for national survival and, ultimately, a global conflict. 
The way ahead should be to develop a comprehensive approach that could 
include unconventional means, used for strategic effects.  
 
To this end, Special Operations should be regarded not only as an adjunct to 
military operations, undertaken by military SOF. Today’s military SOF are 
ideally suited for only parts of a comprehensive approach to insurgencies, 
despite the apparent comprehensiveness of their nine standard missions. 
Special Operations should be regarded as those unconventional actions taken 
to affect the strategic centre of gravity in the conflict: the People. To be 
blunt: Special Operations should not be left solely to SOF, or the military. 
 
One possibility is to establish an Unconventional Department, or a Ministry 
of Special Operations, to serve as an integral part of the strategic decision-
making process, strategic planning, management, and evaluation, on the 
same lines as military forces, governmental organizations, and so on. The 
idea is not new, but it is a bold one. Senior Fellow in National Security 
Studies Max Boot (2006) has argued that we again need something like the 
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) of the Second World War, which 
included analysis, intelligence, anthropology, special operations, 
information, psychological operations, and technology capabilities. He is 
seconded by Dr Kilcullen in his ‘New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflicts’ 
(2007), where he underlines the importance of developing ‘Capabilities for 
dealing with non-elite, grassroots threats (that) include cultural and 
ethnographic intelligence, social systems analysis, information operations, 
early-entry or high-threat humanitarian and governance teams, field 
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negotiation and mediation teams, biometric reconnaissance, and a variety of 
other strategically relevant capabilities.’ Such a strategic service does not, 
however, represent a multi-national effort. The USA, for instance, would be 
an example of a state with the capacity to build such an organization, whilst 
other, smaller nations would not.  
 
CORDS sought to integrate horizontally a series of political, military, 
economic, and informational programmes to maximize the US pacification 
effort in Vietnam. One should not neglect two crucial aspects: leadership 
and unconventionality. CORDS was led in much the same way as a military 
commander – rather than a coordinator, facilitator, or advisor – would 
organize his efforts. Unconventionality, on the other hand, was achieved by 
having a civilian leader, who was on par with the military commander, 
working closely together and unifying their efforts, drawing on the same 
resources, sharing intelligence, and synchronizing efforts to vanquish 
irregular adversaries in Vietnam.  
 
Finally, let us recall that this paper set out to explore a potential role for 
Special Operations Forces in a counterinsurgency. Have SOF been flipped 
away from COIN? Absolutely not. Doctrine may already have an answer. 
After describing the many complicated, interrelated, and simultaneous tasks 
that must be conducted to defeat an insurgency, the new US 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM3-24) states: ‘Key to all these tasks is 
developing an effective host-nation (HN) security force.’ And, as argued by 
Nagl (2005: xiv) foreign forces cannot defeat an insurgency; the best they 
can hope for is to create the conditions that will enable local forces to win 
for them.   
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